Han-Pile, Beatrice. Review of Michel Foucault's INTRODUCTION A L'ANTHROPOLOGIE. NDPR (March 2009).

Foucault, Michel. Introduction à l'Anthropologie. Paris: Vrin, 2008. Trans. as Introduction to Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. New York: Semiotext(e), 2008. Foucault's Introduction to Kant's Anthropology (henceforth IA) and his translation of the latter text make up his 'Thèse complémentaire de Doctorat', which was submitted in 1961 with his main thesis (later published as Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique). Although the translation was published in 1964 by Vrin, with a very short introduction by Foucault, the longer text (a 128 page manuscript kept at the Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne) remained unpublished until 2008. Its focus is the question of the relation between the Anthropology and the Critique, a question prompted for both exegetical and philosophical reasons. Exegetical, because it is very difficult to date precisely the content of the Anthropology: although it is the last text published before Kant's death, it was also a course he gave (and constantly transformed) for over thirty years. Thus the first four sections of IA are devoted to retracing the genesis of the final version through comparison with other writings, both pre- (section 2) and post-critical (section 3). Philosophical reasons, because for Foucault the key to a proper reconstruction and evaluation of both Kant's position and post-Kantian developments resides in understanding the relation between man as an empirical being and man as transcendental subject. The problem is introduced early on in IA, in the form of the following alternative:

was there from 1772 onwards, and underlying perhaps the Critique, a certain concrete image of man that no philosophical elaboration essentially altered, and which is formulated at last . . . in the last of Kant's published texts? . . . But it is also possible that the Anthropology was modified in its central elements as the critical endeavour developed. . . . This is to say that the Critique would add to its specific character of being a propaedeutic to philosophy a constitutive role in the birth and future of the concrete forms of human existence (IA: 12-13; note the use of the conditional and the numerous modal qualifiers).

How these speculations are to be resolved is of great importance both for Foucault's reading of Kant and for his interpretation of modernity. If the Critique turned out to be 'constitutive' for the Anthropology in such a way that the distinction between a priori conditions and empirical facts was preserved, then the Kantian project on the whole would be free of any empirico-transcendental slippage, and Kant's Anthropology could function as a model and point of reference for subsequent anthropologies. If, however, the relationship of subordination was reversed and the Anthropology 'underlaid' the Critique, then the resulting empirico-transcendental confusions would both throw in jeopardy Kant's critical project itself and cast an ominous shadow on the philosophical movements that grew from it. As is well known, five years later Foucault addressed in The Order of Things (henceforth OT), in particular chapters 7 and 9, the issue of the (in his view) nefarious role played by 'man' in contemporary thought. However IA is of particular interest at least for three reasons: (a) it is a close examination (the only long piece of writing he devoted to Kant) of a text which Foucault clearly regarded as seminal, (b) it presents an interestingly ambiguous reading of Kant which oscillates between two incompatible theses (repetition or displacement of the Critique by the Anthropology), an ambiguity which is minimised but still present in OT, and (c) beyond Kant, it expands (from p. 67 onwards) on the nature and influence of anthropological thought itself and anticipates many of the themes which will be central to OT (not just the empirico-transcendental double but also, for example, the analytic of finitude as the circular attempt to give empirical conditions a transcendental role).[4] So what does IA tell us about the relationship between the Anthropology and the Critique? Perhaps revealingly, Foucault's text is ambivalent almost to the end, and it is difficult to organise his various attempts at conceptualising the relation of the two texts . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15505.

Pub: Raffnsøe, Sverre, et al., eds. NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY. FOUCAULT STUDIES 6 (2009).

Editorial:

• "Neoliberal Governmentality" (PDF) by Sverre Raffnsøe, Alan Rosenberg, Alain Beaulieu, Sam Binkley, Jens Erik Kristensen, Sven Opitz, Morris Rabinowitz, Ditte Vilstrup Holm 1-4

Articles:

• "Foucault and the Invisible Economy" (Abstract PDF) by Ute Tellmann 5-24
• "A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity" (Abstract PDF) by Jason Read 25-36
• "Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics" (Abstract PDF) by Trent H. Hamann 37-59
• "The Work of Neoliberal Governmentality: Temporality and Ethical Substance in the Tale of Two Dads" (Abstract PDF) by Sam Binkley 60-78

Reviews:

• Timothy Rayner, Foucault’s Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience (New York: Continuum, 2007) (PDF) by Alan Milchman 79-82
• Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: Columbia UP, 2008) (PDF) by Margaret A. McLaren 83-87
• Cressida J. Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) (PDF) by Bradley Kaye 88-90
• The Revolution Cannot Be Televised. Tamara Chaplin, Turning on the Mind: French Philosophers on Television (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), (PDF) by Adrian Switzer 91-95
• Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 2007) (PDF) by Adrian Switzer 96-104
• Leonard M. Hammer, A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive Thoughts for Normative Issues (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) (PDF) by Denis Duez 105-109
• Jeffrey T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008) (PDF) by Mike Jolley 110-114
• Sandra Lynch, Philosophy and Friendship (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2005) (PDF) by David Konstan 115-119
• Michel Foucault, Introduction à l’Anthropologie (Paris: Vrin «Bibliothèque des Textes Philosophiques», 2008) & Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, CA, 2008 (PDF) Michael Maidan 120-125
• Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askesis: an Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007) (PDF) by Trent H. Hamann 126-130
• Margaret A. McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007) (PDF) by Ellen K Feder 131-135
• Mitchell Dean, Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on Domestic and International Rule (New York: Open University Press, 2007) (PDF) by Alex Means 136-140
• Paying Attention to Foucault’s Roussel. Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel. Trans. Charles Ruas. Intro. James Faubion. Postscript by John Ashbery (London: Continuum, 2006) (PDF) by Timothy O’Leary 141-148

Visit the journal homepage here: http://ej.lib.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/index.

May, Todd. Review of Oliver Feltham's ALAIN BADIOU: LIVE THEORY. NDPR (March 2009).

Feltham, Oliver. Alain Badiou: Live Theory. London: Continuum, 2008. There is a dual thread Feltham follows throughout Badiou's work, the strands of which are entwined. Each of these strands is derived from puzzles that vexed the thought of Badiou's teacher Louis Althusser. One strand concerns the question of how to conceive political change; the other concerns the relation of theory and practice. The intertwining of these strands occurs around the issue of politics. A theory of change must somehow be enlightening for the engagement with political practice. On the other hand, one might ask how much practice itself can enlighten one's theoretical conception of politics and political change. For Badiou, who has never abandoned the field of engaged politics, these issues can be said to structure his thought. It seems to me that by placing them front and center, Feltham has touched on the heart of that thought. . . . Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15526.

Original Portrait of Shakespeare Unveiled.

A portrait of William Shakespeare thought to be the only picture made of the playwright during his lifetime has been unveiled in London. It is believed the artwork dates back to 1610, six years before Shakespeare's death at the age of 52. . . .

Read the rest here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/7932901.stm.

Cfp: "Towards a Philosophy of Life . . . in Continental Philosophy of Religion," Liverpool Hope University, June 26-28, 2009.

"The question whether it is still possible to live is the form in which metaphysics impinges on us urgently today." Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, 112. Traditionally, a common conception of philosophy has been as a melete thanatou or ‘meditation upon death’. However, in recent years it is the significance of the concept of ‘life’ which has begun to receive increasing attention in contemporary European philosophy. Indeed, writing in the wake of the brutalization of life in the death camps of Auschwitz, Adorno poses a central question for current philosophical debate on life, namely, ‘How might life live?’ The aim of this conference is to address this question and in doing so assess recent philosophies of life. In particular, the conference seeks to explore metaphysical, phenomenological, ethical and religious underpinnings of philosophies of life, especially in light of the emergence of ‘continental philosophy of religion’. By enquiring into conceptions of life in contemporary philosophical and religious thought, this conference also aims to reconsider the key project of ancient philosophy: the teaching of the good life. Keynote speakers: Dr. Pamela Sue Anderson (University of Oxford) Professor John D. Caputo (Syracuse University) Professor Don Cupitt (University of Cambridge) Professor Jean-Yves Lacoste (Institut Catholique, Paris) Professor John Milbank (University of Nottingham) Abstracts (no more than 400 words) are invited on a broad range of themes, including: * The concept of life in vitalism and philosophies of immanence (Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Henry, Alain Badiou, etc) * Life, power and politics (especially Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben) * Alterity, gift and life: deconstruction and phenomenology * Rethinking life in light of the body, natality and sexual difference: feminist philosophy of religion and feminist theology * Psychoanalysis (life, death and desire) * Theologies of life (creation, incarnation, sacrament and grace) To submit an abstract (deadline: Friday 17 April, 2009), or for further information please email: Dr. Patrice Haynes - haynesp@hope.ac.uk.

Cfp: "Looking Back on the End of Time: 1890-1910," University of East Anglia, September 4, 2009.

Around the turn of the twentieth century many artists, writers, philosophers and scientists, conducted conversations and debates about the nature of time. Developments in science, technology, and society seemed to necessitate a radical review of the nature, perhaps even the existence, of time. In 1908 the physicist Herman Minkowski announced that ‘space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality’. The philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart did not even wait for time to fade away but declared in the same year that it was ‘unreal’. Nevertheless, more than a hundred years have (apparently) gone by. Did time change forever a century ago? How did the ways in which people think about time change? How did the ways that writers and artists represent time change? Did these developments alter our understanding of space? How can the changes be related to their historical context? How have they been understood and represented since? Is there a distinctively ‘modernist’ version of time, and what is its status today? Can science, philosophy, and the arts talk to each other about time, or do they each have their own times? We invite proposals for twenty-minute papers from the fields of English studies, American studies, philosophy, history of science, history of art, and others, on topics relating to the conceptualisation and representation of time a century ago. Whilst the period 1890-1910 focuses our attention on specific developments in the history of science and philosophy, we welcome papers that discuss any subsequent responses to these ideas. Examples might include: - Einsteinian physics, and its appropriation by novelists, poets, occultists, and mystics; - Henri Bergson’s concept of durée, the hyperspace theories of Charles Howard Hinton and Claude Bragdon , the writing of de Noircarme; - The literary responses of authors such as James Joyce, May Sinclair, Gertrude Stein, H. G. Wells, and Wyndham Lewis to revisions in our understanding of time; - The emergence of scientific romance and science fiction as genres, time travel in fiction and film; - The influence of developments in science and geometry on art movements such as Cubism and Futurism; - Has time recovered from McTaggart’s assault? For further information, visit: http://endoftimeatuea.wordpress.com/.

Shakespeare's First Theatre Found.

Archaeologists believe they have unearthed the remains of Shakespeare's first theatre, the BBC has learned. A team from the Museum of London discovered the foundations of what they believe is the original Globe Theatre in Shoreditch last summer. Built in 1576, it is thought the Bard acted there and that it also hosted the premiere of Romeo and Juliet. . . .

More information here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7931823.stm.

Curran, Angela. Review of Dan Flory's PHILOSOPHY, BLACK FILM, FILM NOIR. NDPR (March 2009).

Flory, Dan. Philosophy, Black Film, Film Noir. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2008. Recently many philosophers have examined how film can prompt philosophical thinking about skepticism, personal identity, ethics, free will and determinism, romantic love and the nature of truth, to name just a few topics. But philosophers have given much less attention to how film can prompt philosophical thinking about race. This neglect of this topic is corrected with the publication of Dan Flory's important and thoroughly researched new book. I will begin with a summary of the book, and then devote the last part of the review to raising some critical questions of evaluation. Flory examines a diverse group of recent American and international films -- ranging from Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing (1992) to Hotel Rwanda (Terry George, 2004) -- that Flory groups under the broad rubric, "black film noir." These films exploit the techniques and themes of film noir in order to advance "blacks' protracted struggle to achieve full social equality" (17), hence the term "black film noir." Over the course of eight chapters, Flory argues that these "black film noir" philosophize by prompting viewers "to reflect upon fundamental human questions like who one is or how one should live" (316). Flory grounds his argument in contemporary philosophy of film, often using analytic concepts developed by philosophers Stanley Cavell, Noël Carroll, and Stephen Mulhall, and by film theorist Murray Smith. . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15452.

"J. M. Coetzee as Moral Philosopher," a Philosophy and Literature Conference, University of the Witwatersrand, March 21-22, 2009.

Saturday 21 March 9:30–11:00 Ward Jones (Rhodes) “Elizabeth Costello as Moral Philosopher” 11:30–1:00 Elisa Galgut (University of Cape Town) “The literary representation of Evil” 2:00–3:30 Carrol Clarkson (University of Cape Town) “J. M. Coetzee: Countervoices” 4:00–6:00 Stephen Mulhall (Oxford) “Realism and the Difficulty of Reality in Literature and Philosophy” Sunday 22 March 9:00–10:15 Patrick Lenta (KwaZulu-Natal) “Discipline in Disgrace” 10:15–11:30 Justin Neuman (Yale) “The Ethics and Erotics of Charity’ 12:00–1:15 Monika Reif-Hülser (Konstanz), "Under Cover: the authority of the narrative voice in Coetzee's 'Age of Iron' taand in 'Diary of a Bad Year” 2:15–3:30 Thad Metz (University of Johannesburg) ““Sympathy and Moral Status in Coetzee: A Philosophical Grounding” 4:00–5:15 Samantha Vice (Rhodes) “Truth and Love Together at Last: Style, Form and Moral Vision in J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron”

Cfp: "Foucault: 25 Years On," Centre for Post-colonial Studies, University of South Australia, June 25, 2009.

Update: Thanks to Anonymous who pointed out that the conference is slated for the University of South Australia (www.unisa.edu.au) and not the other UNISA, the University of South Africa (www.unisa.ac.za). Original Post (March 1, 2009): Twenty five years after his death, reflecting on Foucault is an enormous task. His influence permeates disparate and innumerable fields and informs so much of our thinking, along with that of many great theorists who have followed him. Foucault’s influence is one of ramifying and far reaching interdisciplinary complexity, but he draws us together too, providing a common theoretical baseline to diverse disciplinary endeavours. He shows us the connections between things. Just as his life and his work connects up theoretical pursuits as diverse as queer theory and postcolonial studies, so his influence draws together and draws bridges between theorists. In so doing, Foucault’s legacy muddies the theoretical waters, forcing strange synergies and theoretical configurations such as the antifoundational humanist. Growing from the murky ferment of French colonial history, the father of poststructuralism’s story is as complex as that encounter, and his legacy is as mutating, unsettling and transformative. A reflection on Foucault needs to accommodate a consideration of the enormity of the shadow which such a legacy casts over continuing intellectual production. We invite proposals (300 words or less) responding to the above provocation, particularly those which engage with the Foucault’s influence on the intellectual production of the author. Selected papers will be presented at a conference to be held on 25 June 2009, with peer reviewed proceedings to be published online. Proposals should include an abstract, a short biography of the author/s, name, institutional affiliation and email contact details. Further details and enquiries: Ian Goodwin-Smith, Ian.GoodwinSmith@unisa.edu.au, 8302 4515; CPCS website: http://www.unisa.edu.au/hawkeinstitute/cps/default.asp; CPCS on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/people/Hawke-Cpcs/1405028034.

Cfp: 17th Biennial Conference, North American Sartre Society, University of Memphis, November 19-21, 2009.

At this year’s conference we will be celebrating the 50th anniversary of the publication of the Critique of Dialectical Reason as well as 25 years of NASS. Our keynote speaker will be Robert J. C. Young, a leading postcolonial theorist and one of the few who has recognized the centrality of Sartre to postcolonialism. Among his many works, some devoted to Fanon, is the introduction for the English translation of Colonialisme et néocolonialisme, as well as the chapter on Sartre in his White Mythologies. Papers in any area of Sartrean scholarship are welcome (philosophy, literature, psychology, politics, literature, intellectual history, etc.). Reading time for a paper should be 25-30 minutes (to be followed by an optional commentary and 10 minutes of discussion). In addition to individual papers, we would be most interested in receiving suggestions for panel topics that address any aspect of Sartre’s work; its relationship to the work of other authors. Of special interest for the occasion would be papers that address Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason or any aspect of Sartre’s relation to postcolonialism. Visit the conference homepage here: http://sartresociety.org/2009/03/05/cfp-17th-biennial-conference-of-the-north-american-sartre-society/.

"Blanchot romantique," Maison Française d’Oxford, April 20-21, 2009.

Keynote speakers: Christophe Bident, Leslie Hill, Michael Holland. Marking the first major event on Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) to take place in the UK in the past fifteen years, this conference will bring together some of the most eminent scholars in the field, as well as a number of postgraduates both from the UK and abroad, to address the ways in which Blanchot’s work engages with the Romantic legacy and to explore how this engagement continues to inform contemporary debates on literature, philosophy, and politics. The aim of ‘Blanchot romantique’ is at least twofold: (1) to broaden our understanding of the singular place that Romanticism holds in Blanchot’s writings, and (2) to give a major assessment of his contribution to thinking aesthetics in the wake of Romanticism. At decisive moments in his work, Blanchot engages with a variety of key Romantic notions, including subjectivity and experience, inspiration and imagination, irony and the sublime, the fragment and the total work, violence and revolution. Romanticism thus provides us with a crucial set of concepts to approach the literary, philosophical and political challenge that Blanchot’s writing represents. From a literary perspective, Blanchot offers decisive readings of a number of figures associated with Romanticism and post-Romanticism, both in the French and German traditions (among others, Goethe, Jean-Paul, Hölderlin, Rilke, Sade, Lautréamont, Nerval, Baudelaire, Mallarmé). These readings inform not only his criticism but also his own practice as a writer. From a philosophical and/or theoretical perspective, his thought engages with a number of key eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche), as well as with the leading figures behind the Athenaeum (Novalis, the Schlegels), whose legacies are associated, directly or indirectly, with Romantic thought. The twentieth century continued to reflect upon the question of Romanticism, in particular at the intersection between literature, philosophy, and theory. In this light, the conference will examine Blanchot comparatively with other key critical interlocutors of the twentieth century such as Martin Heidegger, Albert Béguin, Walter Benjamin, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc Nancy. Finally, from a political viewpoint, Blanchot’s work opens new perspectives on Romantic and post-Romantic questions of revolution, violence, history, commitment, and community. His interpretation of the French Revolution and of the May ’68 events are crucial in this regard. PRELIMINARY PROGRAMME: ROMANTIC LEGACIES (I): THEORY Christophe Bident, Université de Paris-Diderot – Paris VII ‘Le neutre est-il une notion romantique?’ Yves Gilonne, University of Nottingham ‘L’auto-réflexivité du Sublime’ Maebh Long, University of Durham ‘A Step Askew: Ironic Parabasis in Blanchot’ Gisèle Berkman, Collège International de Philosophie, Paris ‘Blanchot et le Romantisme allemand: poétique, théorie, pratique’ ROMANTIC LEGACIES (II): PRAXIS Michael Holland, St. Hugh’s College, Oxford ‘Blanchot and Jean-Paul’ Jérémie Majorel, Université de Paris-Diderot – Paris VII ‘Blanchot, narrateur de Mallarmé’ ROMANTIC CONVERSATIONS IN THE 20th CENTURY Jake Wadham, St. Edmund Hall, Oxford ‘Blanchot, Benjamin, and the Absence of the Work’ Hector Kollias, King’s College London ‘Unworking Irony’s Work: Blanchot and de Man as readers of the Athenaeum’ Ian Maclachlan, Merton College, Oxford ‘Blanchot, Derrida, and the Romantic Imagination’ ROMANTIC FRAGMENTATIONS Leslie Hill, University of Warwick ‘Blanchot and Translation’ Patrick ffrench, King’s College London ‘The Fragment, the Disaster, and Melancholy’ POLITICAL ROMANTICISM Ian James, Downing College, Cambridge ‘Naming the Nothing: Nancy and Blanchot on Community’ Martin Crowley, Queens’ College, Cambridge ‘Even now, now, very now’ Parham Shahrjerdi, Université de Paris-Diderot – Paris VII ‘Terreur et révolution’ For further information, contact: John McKeane: john.mckeane@st-annes.ox.ac.uk Hannes Opelz: hdo20@cam.ac.uk (Via http://www.continental-philosophy.org/.)

Nickles, Thomas. "Scientific Revolutions." STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY March 5, 2009.

The topic of scientific revolutions has become philosophically important, especially since Thomas Kuhn's account in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1970). It is controversial whether there have been any revolutions in the strictly Kuhnian sense. It is also controversial what exactly a Kuhnian revolution is, or would be. Many analysts agree that there have been revolutionary scientific developments of various kinds, whether Kuhnian or not, but there is considerable disagreement about their import. For the existence and nature of scientific revolutions is a topic that raises a host of fundamental questions about the sciences and how to interpret them, a topic that intersects most of the major issues that have concerned philosophers of science and their colleagues in neighboring science studies disciplines such as history of science and sociology of science. Even if the so-called Scientific Revolution from Copernicus to Newton fits the attractive, Enlightenment picture of the transition from feudalism to modernity (a claim that is also contested), the putative revolutions in mature sciences (e.g., the relativity and quantum mechanical revolutions) challenge precisely this Enlightenment vision of rational, objective sciences and technologies leading society steadily along the path of progress toward the truth about the world. Although many philosophers and philosophically or historically reflective scientists had commented on the dramatic developments in twentieth-century physics, it was not until Kuhn that such developments seemed so epistemologically and ontologically damaging as to seriously challenge traditional conceptions of science—and hence our understanding of knowledge acquisition in general. Why it was Kuhn's work and its timing that made the major difference are themselves interesting questions for investigation, especially given that others (e.g., Wittgenstein, Fleck, Polanyi, Toulmin, and Hanson) had already broached important “Kuhnian” themes. Was there a Scientific Revolution that replaced pre-scientific thinking about nature and society and thus marked the transition to modernity? Which later developments, if any, are truly revolutionary? Are attributions of revolution usually a sign of insufficient historiographic understanding? In any case, how are such episodes to be explained historically and epistemologically? Are they historical accidents, perhaps avoidable; or are they somehow necessary—and, if so, why, and necessary for what? Is there an overall pattern of scientific development? If so, is it basically one of creative displacement, as Kuhn originally claimed? Do all revolutions have the same structure and function, or are there diverse forms of rupture, discontinuity, or rapid change in science? Do they represent great leaps forward or, on the contrary, does their existence undercut the claim that science progresses? Does the existence of revolutions in mature sciences support a postmodern or “post-critical” (Polanyi) rather than a modern, neo-Enlightenment conception of science in relation to other human enterprises? Does their existence support a strongly constructivist versus a realist conception of scientific knowledge claims? Are they rational or irrational? Do they invite epistemological relativism? What are the implications of revolution for science policy? . . . Read the rest here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-revolutions/.

Lukacs, John. "Putting Man Before Descartes." THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Winter 2009).

Now, near the end of my career as a historian, I have a truth to tell. So, for 15 minutes, please bear with me. I was still very young when I saw that historians, or indeed scholars and scientists and human beings of all kinds, are not objective. Many who wished to impress the world thought that they were objective. And there are still many historians and even more scientists of that kind, men with gray ice on their faces. But isn’t objectivity an ideal? No: because the purpose of human knowledge—indeed, of human life itself—is not accuracy, and not even certainty; it is understanding. . . . History involves the knowledge of human beings of other human beings. This knowledge differs from other kinds, since human beings are the most complex organisms in the entire universe. The ideal of objectivity is the antiseptic separation of the knower from the known. Understanding involves an approach to bring the two closer. But there is, there can be, no essential separation of the knower from the known. . . . Knowledge, which is neither objective nor subjective, is always personal. Not individual: personal. The concept of the individual has been one of the essential misconceptions of political liberalism. Every human being is unique, but he does not exist alone. He is dependent on others (a human baby for much longer than the offspring of other animals); his existence is inseparable from his relations with other human beings. But there is more to that. Our knowledge is not only personal; it is also participant. There is—yet there cannot be—a separation of the knower from the known. We must see further than this. It is not enough to recognize the impossibility (perhaps even the absurdity) of the ideal of their antiseptic, objective separation. What concerns—or should concern—us is something more than the inseparability; it is the involvement of the knower with the known. That this is so when it comes to the reading, researching, writing, and thinking of history should be rather obvious. Detachment from one’s passions and memories is often commendable. But detachment, too, is something different from separation; it involves the ability (issuing from one’s willingness) to achieve a stance of a longer or higher perspective. The choice for such a stance does not necessarily mean a reduction of one’s personal interest, of participation—perhaps even the contrary. This inevitable involvement of the knower with the known exists not only in the relations of human beings with other human beings, but also in what we call “science,” man’s knowledge of physical things, of nature, of matter. I shall come to this later. Before that, a few words about the relationship of mind and matter. Did—does—matter exist independent of the human mind? It did and it does; but, without the human mind, matter’s existence is meaningless—indeed, without the human mind, we cannot think of its existence at all. In this sense it may even be argued that mind preceded and may precede matter (or what we see and then call “matter”). . . . Our thinking of the world, our imagination (and we imagine and see together) anthropomorphizes and humanizes everything, even inanimate things, just as our exploration of the universe is inevitably geocentric. “Know Thyself” is the necessary fundament of our understanding of other human beings, but we can never go wholly outside of ourselves, just as we can never go outside the universe to see it. . . . Read the rest here: http://www.theamericanscholar.org/putting-man-before-descartes/.

Clydesdale, Tim. "Wake Up and Smell the New Epistemology." CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION January 23, 2009.

Popular epistemologies are funny things. The latest one slipped into our party unannounced, slowly replaced all the food and decorations, and then stared back blankly when we asked how our Mexican fiesta had turned into a country-western barbecue. Only after the tequila wears off and we piece together the evening do we realize, with embarrassment, that the change has been a long time coming. For decades, we professors and administrators drank deeply of notions like "knowledge for knowledge's sake" and "the transformative power of the liberal arts," paying little heed as the American populace shifted from widespread respect for the academy to considerable skepticism of it. Today our students occupy the leading edge of that popular shift, with no real interest in the elitist notions that we consume so readily. But they are wise enough to keep their views private, given the economic necessity of attending our party. . . . Read the rest here: http://chronicle.com/free/v55/i20/20b00701.htm.

Alweiss, Lilian. Review of Robert Sokolowski's PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON. NDPR (March 2009).

Sokolowski, Robert. Phenomenology of the Human Person. Cambridge: CUP, 2008. When Sokolowski raises the question of what is distinctive about the human person, he touches upon a theme that has troubled philosophy ever since its inception. Whether the answer is that we have a capacity to reason or speak (Aristotle), that we are not merely conscious but self-conscious beings (Kant), that we are free (Rousseau) or that we live with an understanding of Being (Heidegger), all these thinkers believe that the question is essential, as it allows us not only to understand what it means to be a human being and what kind of life we should be living but, moreover, what it means to do philosophy. This comes to light in Sokolowski's book Phenomenology of the Human Person which provides a blend of erudite scholarly discussion of notably Aristotle and Husserl, as well as contemporary linguistic theory and recent developments of neuroscience. The topic is classical through and through, yet the approach is refreshingly modern and original. The classical theme that weaves its way through the book is the claim that what makes us distinct is that we are philosophical insofar as we are agents of truth. To be an agent of truth according to Sokolowski is synonymous with being what Aristotle calls a 'rational animal'. We are told that the pursuit of truth is not simply a choice that some of us happen to take up while others don't, but it is a choice that determines whether we are able to realize ourselves fully as human beings or not. The desire for truth as such, Sokolowski calls it veracity, is something that pertains to our nature. 'It is very deep in us, more basic than any particular desire or emotion, more elementary than any particular attempt to find things out, and more fundamental than any act of telling the truth to others. We are made human by it, and it is there in us to be developed well or badly' (21). Veracity is not a choice. We could say it is a predisposition that we can either actualise or not. Failing to do so results in the failure of being a fully fledged human being which must ultimately lead to unhappiness. As he observes: 'we can be happy as human beings only by cultivating our veracity into truthfulness' (21). Sokolowski clearly rehearses classical themes. However, what marks out his approach is that he does not treat them in an antiquated, but in an analytically refreshingly modern way. For to arrive at these conclusions, Sokolowski realizes that he must first account for how we actually become agents of truth and it is this question that forms the core of the book. We learn that the capacity of speech -- syntax in language, thought and, indeed, pictorial images -- plays a key role in the attainment of truth. Here are some of the key features he presents: Drawing on the work of the linguist Derek Bickerton, he distinguishes protolanguage from human language. Protolanguage such as animal cries or baby talk only has a semantics insofar as it 'names' things, but lacks the additional syntax of human language. With the introduction of syntax we come to use indexical expressions and thus no longer just think or express things but take responsibility for our thoughts. In a word, we become agents of truth. Conversely, by using quotation marks we are able to 'disappropriate what we are about to say' (75). Since syntactical discussion of things goes beyond the continuity of perception and constitutes states of affairs, we can investigate the truth and correctness of what has been said. Syntax makes it possible for us to refer to things that are absent. This facilitates pictorial thinking and abstract thought. Furthermore, by means of syntax we can draw distinctions between what is essential and what is accidental and thereby we can explore the true nature of things. Animals that only have the capacity of protolanguage cannot do any of these things. That is why Sokolowski believes that only we humans are singled out as agents of truth. . . . Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15487.

Bergo, Bettina. Review of Soren Overgaard's WITTGENSTEIN AND OTHER MINDS. NDPR (March 2009).

Overgaard, Soren. Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. London: Routledge, 2007. Søren Overgaard's Wittgenstein and Other Minds (WM) makes two interesting contributions to the Wittgenstein literature. First, it approaches contemporary debates about the problem of "other minds" (WM 2) as a conceptual and ontological problem -- viz., how we conceive of mind in the first place (before turning to determinations concerning the minds of others). It also extends that question to ethics, since the way in which we pose the question of other minds, or subjects, frequently concerns what behaviors are appropriate to adopt in regard to those others. This is notably the case when questions of human well being, or suffering, arise. Overgaard's second contribution is his lucid reading of the middle and later Wittgenstein, including a close examination of the philosopher's posthumous Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Overgaard follows Wittgenstein's "problems" approach to other minds in light of concerns that prove irreducibly ethical. The author's conviction, which he demonstrates systematically, is that the later Wittgenstein does indeed help us "to think differently about the issue at hand," which he terms "intersubjectivity," thereby displacing it from rigidly epistemological frameworks. Showing the importance of Wittgenstein's thought for ethical questions also means reading him rightly, and that requires navigating past four potential dangers. The first argues that Wittgenstein's "community account" or social conception of mind evacuates most, if not all, dimensions of subjectivity in favor of a pre-existing social context. The second danger lies in the claim that, in Wittgenstein, the very idea of a subject, present differently to itself than it is to others, is eliminated. Both dangers, the individualist versus the anti-individualist, and the immanentist versus the anti-immanentist one, are exaggerations of Wittgenstein's own arguments and weaken the claims he makes for a social understanding of mind, against an inaccessible or sequestered immanence. What Overgaard proposes to do, by way of elucidation, is to reopen the problem of solipsism as it arose in debates about intentionality. He then traces Heidegger's and Sartre's criticisms of Husserlian intentionality and indicates, finally, how Levinas's conception of the asymmetrical call coming from the Other supplements both Husserl's and Sartre's rather solipsistic "intersubjectivity." Overgaard concludes that, taken together, Sartre and Levinas give us a way past solipsism that resonates with significant concerns of the later Wittgenstein, writing on philosophical psychology. To be sure -- and unlike these "continental" philosophers -- Wittgenstein was concerned with the grammar operative in ethical language games, as in the asymmetry between first and third person statements. . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15450.

Cfp: "C. L. R. James in Focus: Crossing Boundaries," 4th Workshop on Caribbean Theory, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, April 22, 2009.

The work of the noted Caribbean scholar C. L. R. James will be the focus of the 4th workshop on Caribbean theory to be held by the Department of Language, Linguistics and Literature of the Cave Hill Campus, University of the West Indies, Barbados on Wednesday April 22nd, 2009. We hereby invite papers on any aspect of James’s career or work, ranging from his critical writings on Caribbean thought, politics and society, literature and popular culture to his creative writings. Some areas that this workshop seeks to discuss include (though are not limited to): James and Caribbean culture; James and Caribbean modernity; James and black nationalism; James the internationalist; James and West Indies cricket; James the philosopher; James and Marxism; James on history; James the literary theorist and critic; James's fiction. Please send a 200 word abstract via email no later than March 20, 2009 to one of the following members of the Organising Committee: Richard Clarke (richard.clarke@cavehill.uwi.edu) or Andrew Armstrong (ahpa44@hotmail.com) or Nicola Hunte (nicola.hunte@cavehill.uwi.edu). (Please include your name, title and institutional affiliation.)

Cfp: "Interlocking Basins of a Globe," University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, January 13-15, 2010.

A Conference Honouring Nobel Laureate Derek Walcott. Poet, playwright, essayist, critic, dramatist and painter, Derek Walcott, is recognised as one of the world’s greatest living writers. Among his many awards and honours is the Nobel Prize for Literature which he won in 1992. The conference 'Interlocking Basins of a Globe' will explore the multifaceted nature of Walcott’s work. It invites reflections on his evolving thought and analyses of Caribbean civilisation – his beloved Antilles, and the cartography of its origins. His far-ranging poetic imagination gives metaphoric expression to the creative possibilities of the ambivalences that exist within the New World psyche. Its axes of loss and plenitude form the ground of unprecedented possibility, facilitating unique intersections between cultures that enable a leap into the new. Walcott theorises the world of the Americas. Walcott’s vision evolves from a desire to inhabit and be nourished by multiple worlds simultaneously. On the one hand, this response to New World history and sensibility has been, in some measure, shaped by his lifelong dialogue with the work and theories of other Caribbean creators and thinkers; and, on the other, from his acknowledged apprenticeship to literary ancestors and his collaboration with writers from across the globe. These streams have fed debates about the nature of his relationship to the Caribbean, and to Europe, Africa and Asia. His many essays and commentaries often respond to such concerns and the politics of that relation contribute to the complex tapestry of his drama and poetry. Topics: Papers are invited on the following topics: o Literary Ghosts and confrères o Here and Elsewhere: the Politics of Exile and Belonging o The Visual Imagination o Rethinking the Sublime o Time, Landscape and Myth o Walcott’s Cities: A Babel like Heaven o Caribbean Contestations o Walcott as Critic, Commentator and Journalist Presentation Formats: o Formal presentations using any medium (limited to 20 minutes) o Panel discussions – two or three papers encompassing a range of perspectives on an issue o Round Tables – informal presentation settings (limited to 20 minutes) o Workshops – practical, interactive sessions (limited to 2 hours) o Performance – drama, dance, music, oratory, etc. o Exhibitions – art, craft, film, audio recordings, etc. What to Submit: The proposal should identify the issue and/or topic as well as presentation type, and should include information on resources/facilities that will be required. Submit an abstract of not more than 250 words and a short profile (approximately 150 words). Where there are co-presenters, submit a profile for each presenter. Schedule: 15 September 2009: Deadline for submission of Abstracts and Proposals 15 October 2009: Notification of acceptance Send Submissions to: Dr Jean Antoine Jean.Antoine@sta.uwi.edu; ext.3021; Dr Paula Morgan Paula.Morgan@sta.uwi.edu; ext. 3033; Professor Barbara Lalla Barbara.Lalla@sta.uwi.edu; ext. 3768.

Cfp: "John Dewey's 150th Birthday Celebration," Center for Inquiry, Amherst, October 22-24, 2009.

An International Conference on Dewey's Impact on America and the World. Papers should address some aspect of Dewey's work and its influence. Invited speakers include: Nadine Strossen, current President of the American Civil Liberties Union; Philip Kitcher, John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University; Larry Hickman, Director of the Center for Dewey Studies; Ron Giere, Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota. Reading time should be between 20-25 minutes. Please only submit papers for blind review. Papers should be sent via email in .pdf or .doc format. Please submit papers to: jshook@centerforinquiry.net Submitted papers due: September 1st, 2009.