Philosopher's Zone: "A Very American Philosophy." September 17, 2011.

Pragmatism was a philosophical doctrine devised by Americans and to a large extent for Americans. This week, we examine its origins, the stories of the men behind it, what it means and its enduring significance, not just for America but for the world.

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/stories/2011/3316686.htm

Cfp: Christiane Chauviré and Sabine Plaud, eds. "Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: a Reassessment," EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 4.2 (2012).

The connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the pragmatist tradition are often alluded to, but seldom thoroughly explored. It is an established fact that Wittgenstein was scarcely acquainted with such authors as Charles Sanders Peirce or John Dewey, even though he had a rather extended knowledge of the philosophy of William James. Nevertheless, the converging features between Wittgenstein and pragmatism are quite striking: we shall hardly need to mention Wittgenstein’s claim that meaning is use, his insistence on the pictorial dimension of mathematical proof, or again his emphasis on action in his characterization of will and intention. On the other hand, modern and contemporary pragmatist philosophers (R. B. Brandom, H. Putnam...) have often developed a complex and intricate relationship to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, since they sometimes use it as a support to their own arguments, but sometimes also point at its insufficiencies, and try to amend them. Hence the following questions: in what sense may Wittgenstein’s philosophy be described as “pragmatist”? Symmetrically, in what sense may contemporary pragmatist philosophy be described as “Wittgensteinian”? What are the incompatibilities, if any, between these two traditions? Lastly, what part has been played by such “middlemen” as C. K. Ogden or F. P. Ramsey in the interactions between Wittgenstein and pragmatism? Answering these questions should provide an opportunity to explore the dialogues and/or misunderstandings between a European or continental tradition in philosophy, and a more specifically American analysis of the notions of meaning, reasoning, action, etc. This special issue of EJPAP will welcome historical or even “philological” approaches, as well as more analytic ways of dealing with these debates.

Papers should be sent to Sabine Plaud (plaudsabine@yahoo.fr) before May 1st 2012. Papers should not exceed 10,000 words and must include an abstract of 200-400 words and a list of works cited. Papers will be selected on the basis of a process of blind review. Acceptance of papers will be notified before July 1st, 2012.

Clough, Sharyn. Review of Alexandra L. Shuford, FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND AMERICAN PRAGMATISM . NDPR (April, 2011).

Shuford, Alexandra L.  Feminist Epistemology and American Pragmatism: Dewey and Quine.  London: Continuum, 2010.

Feminist Epistemology and American Pragmatism: Dewey and Quine by Alexandra Shuford is the third in a recent series of books from Continuum that will be of interest to those following debates within feminist epistemology and philosophy of science (the other two books are Rationality and Feminist Philosophy by Deborah K. Heikes, reviewed earlier this year in NDPR, and Objectivity in the Feminist Philosophy of Science by Karen Cordrick Haely). Each of these three books is authored by philosophers new to these debates, consistent with Continuum's mission to "actively seek out the emerging generation." These slim volumes are not inexpensive ($120.00 each and not available in paperback), but each contains something of value.

The strength of Shuford's presentation is her application of Dewey's theory of inquiry to the problem of the high rate of caesarean sections in US hospitals. This latter problem is serious and Shuford's analysis is a welcome addition to feminist attempts to address it. This key chapter, "Feminist Pragmatist Inquiry," is the last of six that also include "Birthing Feminist Pragmatist Epistemologies," "Quine's Naturalized Epistemology," "Antony's Analytic Feminist Empiricism," "Nelson's Holistic Feminist Empiricism," and "Dewey's Theory of Inquiry."

Shuford's main thesis is that Nelson and Antony's feminist use of Quine, though in the right pragmatist spirit, still fails to acknowledge fully the embodied nature of knowing that is captured by Dewey and is necessary for understanding and criticizing phenomena. . . .

Visit: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=23309.

Ball, Terence. Review of Robert B. Talisse, DEMOCRACY AND MORAL CONFLICT. NDPR (October 2010).

Talisse, Robert B.  Democracy and Moral Conflict. Cambridge: CUP, 2009.

[I]f there once was a fairly seamless American consensus (which I rather doubt, as I shall later explain), there is no longer. This is the ragged backdrop against which Robert Talisse attempts to argue a new and compelling case for democracy in post-consensus America and elsewhere. He writes that at present "our popular democratic politics is driven by insults, scandal, name-calling, fear-mongering, mistrust, charges of hypocrisy, and worse" (p. 1). Hardly Habermas's "ideal speech situation" in which "the forceless force of the better argument" carries the day![3]

Philosophers, political theorists and others who try to account for and make sense of such discord are at a loss to do so in any wholly satisfactory way. Oversimplifying somewhat, two general accounts have emerged of late. The first is "the clash of civilizations account, which holds that the world is on the brink of . . . a global conflict between distinct and incompatible ways of life." This is the view advanced in very different ways in Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (1996) and in Benjamin R. Barber's Jihad vs. McWorld (1995). There are global and local variants of this view; according to the latter, a clash of civilizations or a "culture war" is being waged within the United States.

A second account -- "the democracy deficit narrative" -- holds that a once-widely shared commitment to democracy is in decline, as citizens draw ever-sharper lines dividing them from their fellow citizens, which makes it ever more difficult to find common ground or to compromise (pp. 1-2). According to these two accounts, politics is thus either a politics of difference driven by a kind of "us vs. them" tribalism or by a militant moralism -- which is of course different from morality -- that brooks no quarter and no compromise.

Under these conditions of moral pluralism and fundamental clashes of conviction, the stage seems set for a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes. If this war is to be avoided, Talisse argues, we shall as democrats have to forgo any claim to base our commitment to democracy on prior moral commitments, since those very commitments are in contention and conflict. Talisse opts instead for an epistemic defense of democracy. His contention is that even though we disagree morally, we are all pretty well in agreement epistemically. This is because we subscribe to a real but largely unconscious and unargued "folk epistemology" (about which more in a moment). Before expounding and defending that bold and even audacious claim, however, he has some spade-work to do. . . .

Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=21609.

Perring, Christian. Review of John R. Shook, et al., eds. A COMPANION TO PRAGMATISM. MOR May 5, 2009.

Shook, John R., and Joseph Margolis, eds. A Companion to Pragmatism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

I'm starting to wonder whether "Pragmatism" any longer serves as a useful label for a branch of contemporary philosophy. (I'll use the capitalized word "Pragmatism" here to emphasize it is the philosophical theory I'm talking about.) Most of the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy address either individual philosophers, or areas of philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, and Heidegger; Ethics, Philosophy of Science, and Early Modern Philosophy, for example. Only 3 others address particular traditions of thought with a definite point of view, on Feminism, Rationalism, and Relativism. None of the Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy address particular traditions, The series of Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, Religion and Culture, numbering 117 at present, including ones on Postmodern Theology, German Idealism, and Critical Theory, does have one on Peirce, but none on Pragmatism. Christopher Hookway in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Pragmatism says in the introduction that, "The core of pragmatism was the pragmatist maxim, a rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their ‘practical consequences’. In the work of Peirce and James, the most influential application of the pragmatist maxim was to the concept of truth. But the pragmatists have also tended to share a distinctive epistemological outlook, a fallibilist anti-Cartesian approach to the norms that govern inquiry." He mentions Rorty, Putman and Brandom as modern pragmatists, but points out that Putnam denies that he is a pragmatist.

This collection edited by Shook and Margolis is a large volume with over 430 pages and 38 contributions. It is divided into three sections: "Major Figures," "Transforming Philosophy," and "Culture and Nature." The 12 major figures include, in addition to the obvious candidates, F.C.S. Schiller, Jane Addams, Alain Locke, Quine, Putnam, and Habermas. The essays in this section include some biographical information and vary in their scope. . . .

Read the rest here: http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=4883&cn=394.

Hildebrand, David L. Review of Colin Koopman, PRAGMATISM AS TRANSITION. NDPR (August 2010).

Koopman, Colin. Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. New York: Columbia UP, 2009.

Pragmatism as Transition (hence, Transition) aims to develop a new "wave" of pragmatism, "Transitional Pragmatism" or "Transitionalism." The need for such an alternative is justified, ostensibly, by an "impasse" or "holding pattern" which is paralyzing various contemporary pragmatisms and preventing them from doing "cultural criticism" and helping solve pressing (non-philosophical) ethical and political problems. Transition's basic strategy is to diagnose the impasse by showing a tension between two major historical roots (or "waves") of pragmatism and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each. Each of these two historical waves of pragmatism reveal, it is argued, various "transitional" elements of their own which can be selectively salvaged for use in the new and improved pragmatism, Transitionalism.

More specifically, the "1st wave" of pragmatism includes American classical pragmatists (CP) C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, primarily; the "2nd wave" includes figures sometimes called neopragmatists or linguistic pragmatists (NP): Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, and Hilary Putnam, mainly. Many other figures (pragmatists, non-pragmatists, and others) are enlisted to advance critical and constructive points, with special help coming from Pierre Bourdieu, Stanley Cavell, Bernard Williams, and Michel Foucault. Despite this large and diverse cast, Transition primarily addresses itself to scholars in the American pragmatist tradition; we conclude this because the majority of close analyses (when given) are spent interpreting or criticizing Dewey. (The extent to which we were persuaded by these analyses forms the core of this review.) Nevertheless, we believe that something of interest can be found here for anyone interested in the above mentioned figures, various pragmatisms, or theories regarding genealogy, sociology, or anthropology.

The book consists of seven chapters and an introduction, notes, a bibliography, and an index. The introduction outlines some key terms and then neatly encapsulates the structure and motivation for the book's argument. Chapter 1 explicates the core components of Transitionalism, namely meliorism, historicity, and temporality; chapter 2, called "largely an effort in quotation," seeks to show that "transitionalist" themes characterize "every major pragmatist thinker" (7) as it begins comparing classical and contemporary streams within pragmatism. Chapter 3 labors to establish the necessity of a 3rd wave (Transitionalism) by showing how and why an impasse exists between the first two waves. Arguing that CP is too foundationalist-leaning ("experience-centric") and NP is too narrowly focused on linguistic-practice ("language-centric") the chapter is "concerned to point out certain deficiencies that result from placing too much stress on experience or language rather than on the processes of transitioning in which both experience and language ought to be situated." (8) Chapters 4, 5, and 6 seek to utilize the previous chapters' material by demonstrating how seeing through a "transitioning" lens can relieve longstanding impasses in epistemology, ethics, and political theory (e.g., a solution to the utilitarian/deontology impasse in ethical theory is proffered). Finally, Chapter 7 pleads for much greater attention to genealogical approaches to criticism, such as found in Foucault. These approaches, Transition argues, supply two lacunae in pragmatism: (a) a method for identifying our problems' specific historical roots (rather than focusing too singularly upon consequences, which, it is argued, CP typically does) and (b) a better mechanism for creating problems which stir up thinking -- a.k.a. "problematization." The chapter (and book) ends with a plea for more cross-pollination between genealogical criticism and pragmatism. . . .

Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=21068.

"Action and Interaction," Nordic Pragmatism Network, University of Uppsala, Sweden, June 1-2, 2010.

(This conference has obviously already taken place but I include it as some may find it interesting.)

From the pragmatist point of view, action is central to all philosophical problem-solving: philosophical – also conceptual and theoretical – issues are never unrelated to action. While philosophy of action is also part of other philosophical approaches, the pragmatist stance can only be comprehended as a philosophy of action.

What exactly does this mean? The full implications of pragmatism's emphasis on action still call for discussion and exploration. What is the distinctively pragmatic understanding of action? How does this understanding distinguish pragmatism from other traditions? What are the consequences of the pragmatist view to contemporary philosophical reflection on fields such as science, religion, ethics, education and anthropology?

One implication of the pragmatist view concerns our understanding of our relationship with reality. The classical pragmatists, John Dewey and William James in particular, argued that the connection between human beings and the world they inhabit is centrally a dynamic, two-way relationship: both the acting subject and the world are changed in and by the action process.

A closely related, second implication concerns our conception of the self and subjectivity. According to the pragmatists, the human self not merely engages in action but is a product of action. In this vein, George Herbert Mead showed how human subjectivity is born in interaction and thus rests on intersubjectivity.

A third pragmatist implication is relevant for both moral and political philosophy: pragmatism’s focus on agency makes it eminently suitable for dealing with social and political issues. Existence is action – to exist is to be an acting, responsible being. This understanding of human activity opens up new ways to reflect on moral, social and political responsibility, such as that given rise to by our relationship to the environment or contemporary religious diversity and multicultural society.

Revolutionary as these ideas were a century ago, some of them have recently been rediscovered in other fields of study, such as cognitive science. The basic character of action and interaction has for a long time held the attention of pragmatist philosophers. Now the notion of thought as necessarily embedded has gained ground outside of pragmatism and attracted renewed interest.

The Third Nordic Pragmatism Conference focuses on pragmatism's view of action with the goal of clarifying its meaning and characteristics, its relation to other philosophical approaches as well as its consequences in different fields of philosophical work.

Visit the conference website here: http://www.nordprag.org/npc3.html.

Pub: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 2.1 (2010).

Symposia: “Individuals” (Guest editor: Anthony J. Graybosch, California State University, Chico):

• Susan Haack, "The Differences that Make a Difference: William James on the Importance of Individuals"
• Rosa M. Calcaterra, "Epistemology of the Self in a Pragmatic Mood"
• Rossella Fabbrichesi, "The Body of the Community: Peirce, Royce, and Nietzsche"
• Robert Main, "From Fancy Amoeba to Fallible Self: Peirce’s Evolutionary Theory of Human Persons"
• Olav Bryant Smith, "The Social Self of Whitehead’s Organic Philosophy"
• Jeroen Gerrits, "Disagreement as Duty: On the Importance of the Self and Friendship in Cavell’s Moral Philosophy"
• Andrea Punzi, "The Practice of the Circle: Individual, World, Permanence in Ralph Waldo Emerson"
• Heidi White, "William James’s Pragmatism: Ethics and the Individualism of Others"
• Anthony J. Graybosch, "Saints? (in Lieu of a Preface)"

Essays:

• Sami Pihlström, "Nordic Pragmatism"
• Susi Ferrarello, "On the Rationality of Will in James and Husserl"
• Barbara Thayer-Bacon, "A Pragmatist and Feminist Relational (E)pistemology"

Book Reviews:

• Sami Pihlström and Henrik Rydenfelt, Pragmatist Perspectives. Acta Philosophica Fennica 86, The Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki, 2009;
• Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008).

Download the essays here: http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/.

Sperry, Elizabeth A. Review of Alan Malachowski, THE NEW PRAGMATISM. NDPR (May 2010).

Malachowski, Alan. The New Pragmatism. Chesham: Acumen, 2010. Alan Malachowski's The New Pragmatism accomplishes its central goal, which is to introduce non-specialists to the work of Rorty, Putnam, and their forebears Peirce, James, and Dewey. Malachowski nicely explains the main connections and points of difference between these figures, as well as how their work has been received. Philosophers who lack detailed knowledge of pragmatism could do worse than to begin with this relatively slim volume, which reads quickly, neither bogging down under a load of technicalities nor over-simplifying the issues. Malachowski urges adoption of the term "The New Pragmatism" (apparently coined by Cheryl Misak) to describe the work of Putnam, Rorty, and their philosophical co-workers, because, he says, the "neo" in neo-pragmatism implies inferiority to classical pragmatism. Rorty sometimes called himself a neo-pragmatist, so presumably the rhetorical concern is not universal. Regardless, Malachowski treats Putnam, Rorty, and the classical pragmatists with equal respect, which is not always the case in this philosophical arena. Quite often scholars attached to Dewey are dismissive of Rorty, or those impressed by Putnam have little time for James (this despite the fact that Rorty wrote admiringly of Dewey, as did Putnam of James). Malachowski's unabashedly pro-pragmatist stance enables him to analyze each figure's strengths and weaknesses charitably, and to explain how less-than-nuanced criticisms -- for instance, those lobbed by Russell against James -- have been readily accepted in some philosophical circles. . . . Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=19671.

Solum, Lawrence B. "Legal Theory Lexicon: Pragmatism." LEGAL THEORY BLOG December 28, 2008.

There was a time when those in the know, the cognoscenti of the legal academy, subscribed to what was widely know as the "theory of the month club." But something became quite clear as the years became decades: there were no winners in the debates between and among the advocates of big normative theories. Skirmishes and battles were won and lost, but there were no declarations of victory, surrenders, or peace treaties in the theory wars. So it was probably inevitable that there should be some sort of reaction--an antitheoretical counterrevolution. And there was--or rather, there were several reactions. One move was away from the normative altogether and towards positive law and economics and empirical legal studies. Another move was away from abstract theories and towards contextual approaches to feminist legal theory and critical race theory. And yet another move was to pragmatism--a term that resonates with both the heritage of American philosophical pragmatism (Pierce, James, and Dewey) and the appeal of common sense in its particularly lawyerly form--the preoccupation with the practical. This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon provides an introduction to "legal pragmatism" for law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory. As always, the Lexicon provides a "quick and dirty" introduction to a topic on which whole articles and books can and have been written. Legal pragmatism is related to (but distinct from) philosophical pragmatism. . . . Read the rest here: http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/12/legal-theory--6.html.

Hildebrand, David. "Review of Robert Talisse's A PRAGMATIST PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY." NDPR (August 2008).

Talisse, Robert B. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. London: Routledge, 2007. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy comprises an epilogue, preface, and six main chapters. Preface and epilogue offer Talisse's motivations. These frame the book and Talisse uses them to explicate the "pragmatist roots and motivations" (vii) of democracy he first offered in his recent Democracy After Liberalism. He also intends to expose (and shame) contemporary pragmatists who, Talisse claims, promulgate "conspiracy stories" about an "eclipse" of classical pragmatism (CP). Such stories are pernicious for cultivating "attitudes, habits, and scholarly practices" that foster "resentment" and "a regrettable and ultimately self-defeating intellectual insularity." (134) Chapter 1, "Pragmatism's Ambiguous Legacy," provides an acerbic potted history of how contemporary CPs have positioned themselves as "inheritors and stewards" of this tradition -- typically by contesting Richard Rorty's excesses or lamenting analytic philosophy's impoverished ambitions. Pace these pragmatists, however, Talisse claims, there is no such unified thing as CP, and he justifies this by pointing to deep differences between Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. (Of particular portent here is Talisse's sense in Peirce of a distinctly "minimalist" view of inquiry; this interpretation provides the ground for his development, later, of a new pragmatist democracy.) "Can Democracy be a Way of Life?" (Chapter 2) elaborates on how Dewey and Peirce were significantly different, arguing that Deweyan democracy constitutes what John Rawls called a "comprehensive doctrine." Because any such doctrine must exclude other comprehensive (but nevertheless reasonable) views, Dewey's democracy proves self-refuting: since it is oppressive to pluralism it fatally contradicts Dewey's core democratic values. Chapter 3, "Peirce, Inquiry, and Politics," and chapter 4, "Pluralism and the Peircean View," ground an alternative pragmatist approach found in Peirce's two famous pragmatist papers. Those works, Talisse claims, show how Peirce's advocacy for the "method of science" already reveals his epistemic preference for certain basic political arrangements; they also provide an account of inquiry "thin" enough to both serve democratic theory and still be unobjectionable to all rational comers. This theory would be more than just procedural because it does promote a way of life; but its substance would be "thin" because its prescriptions align with what is already immanent in our best practices. Thus, this Peircean view avoids the problems with pluralism which doom Dewey. With the central argument made, chapter 5, "Posner's Pragmatic Realism," further ratifies the Peircean view by demonstrating its superiority to another contemporary pragmatist view by Richard Posner. Finally, chapter 6, "The Case of Sidney Hook," presents Talisse's interpretation of Hook's theory and practice. By highlighting Hook's under-appreciated Peircean affinities, Talisse aims to show why Hook deserves greater consideration as a first-rate philosopher of democracy. . . . Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=13965.

Hookway, Christopher. "Pragmatism." STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, August 16, 2008.

Pragmatism was a philosophical tradition that originated in the United States around 1870. The most important of the ‘classical pragmatists’ were Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). The influence of pragmatism declined during the first two thirds of the twentieth century, but it has undergone a revival since the 1970s with philosophers being increasingly willing to use the writings and ideas of the classical pragmatists, and also a number of thinkers, such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and Robert Brandom developing philosophical views that represent later stages of the pragmatist tradition. The core of pragmatism was the pragmatist maxim, a rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their ‘practical consequences’. In the work of Peirce and James, the most influential application of the pragmatist maxim was to the concept of truth. But the pragmatists have also tended to share a distinctive epistemological outlook, a fallibilist anti-Cartesian approach to the norms that govern inquiry. Read the rest here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/.

CFP: "Pragmatism and the Ethics of War," Society for Classical Pragmatism Studies, University of South Florida, March 5-7, 2009.

Keynote: John J. Stuhr, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Emory University. Kynote address: "Our Love of War and What to Do About It. The United States has been involved in wars and military campaigns for approximately 3/4 of the years it has been in existence. There can be no doubt that war is a part of the American condition. What, then, does philosophical pragmatism -- a uniquely American school of thought, born during what was arguably the most peaceful period in U.S. history -- have to say on the subject of war? We will consider all papers dealing with pragmatic themes and military conflict, with preference for papers which connect the works of the classical pragmatists to contemporary problems. Suggested topics include, but are not limited to: Just War Theory The Global War on Terror The Ethics of Torture War and Uncertainty The Status of the Enemy Rights During Wartime War and Media Coverage Propaganda Asymmetric Warfare Terrorism as Tactic The Psychology of War Nonviolent Resistance The Ethics of Peemptive Strikes Individual Responsibility and the Military Inquiries and electronic submissions should be sent to: cps.usf@gmail.com. Acceptable document formats: .DOC, .PDF, and .RTF. Please have your paper prepared for blind review, with the e-mail serving as a cover sheet. Papers should be timed for a 20 minute reading (About 10-12 pages). Submission Deadline: November 4th, 2008.

First Nordic Pragmatism Conference in Science, Religion and Politics, Nordic Pragmatism Network, University of Helsinki, July 2-4, 2008.

Philosophical pragmatism has aroused renewed interest among philosophers over the past few decades. Its philosophical outlook, which for a long time was regarded either as methodologically weaker than analytic philosophy or as less interesting than various post-structuralist and 'postmodern' approaches, is now an almost natural starting point for researchers in the humanities and social sciences. Pragmatism has in recent years attracted a number of Nordic philosophers who are currently working in different fields within philosophy and related subjects. The first Nordic Pragmatism Conference will, for the first time, bring these Nordic philosophers together with both one another and prominent American and European scholars of pragmatism. Its aim is to create a context for further contacts and cooperation among philosophers working on pragmatism both in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. The theme of the conference is the general question concerning both the critical and constructive influence of pragmatism in science, religion, and politics. This allows for a broad and diverse philosophical questioning and discussion between philosophers from different backgrounds and fields of investigation. In addition, attention will be given to the influence of pragmatist philosophy in the Nordic countries. Further information is here: http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/npc.html.

Jackman, Henry. "Review of Cheryl Misak, ed. THE NEW PRAGMATISTS." NDPR May 14, 2008.

Misak, Cheryl, ed. The New Pragmatists. Oxford: OUP, 2007.

After William James published his Pragmatism in 1907, C.S. Peirce changed the name of his own position from "pragmatism" to "pragmaticism" in order to disassociate himself from what he took to be the overly 'subjective' aspects of James's newly topical view. This tension between Peirce and James persists today, and Cheryl Misak usefully distinguishes the Jamesian strain of "Neo-Pragmatism", most famously associated with Richard Rorty, from what she calls the "New Pragmatism", a position that stands to Neo-Pragmatism as Peirce did to James. Misak considers it characteristic of New Pragmatists to think that "standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity" (p. 2), but precisely where the lines are between, say, Metaphysical Realism, New Pragmatism and Neo-Pragmatism remains hard to specify, and what a worked out New Pragmatism would look like appears to be different in each of the eight essays in this excellent collection. All of the papers are new with the volume, and in what follows I'll only be able to highlight some themes that run through groups of the essays, along with some differences between the authors involved. Such themes will include (1) the relation of the New Pragmatism to its classical predecessors, (2) just how robust an account of truth and objectivity New Pragmatism can be expected to offer, and (3) whether or not the New Pragmatism should provide an account of truth and objectivity for all of the language or just some subset of it. Unfortunately, much that would be worth discussing must be left out, but I hope to at least give a feel for some of the concerns driving this consistently engaging collection of papers. . . .

Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=13065.

"Transatlantic Reverberations: Prospects of Pragmatic Humanism," University of Lodz, September 27-30, 2008.

The term "humanism" has been used by F.C.S Schiller to describe his own brand of pragmatism, and by William James to express the basic goal of pragmatist movement. This goal was to call attention to the richness and plurality of human experience, and to attack serious challenges facing civilization from a pragmatic perspective, free of the modern infatuation with certainty and abstract theory. Thus, classical pragmatists took up some of the intellectual goals of Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus and Montaigne. Today the interest in Pragmatic Humanism is revived by eminent thinkers on both sides of the ocean who urge that we abandon modern interest in certainty, epistemic foundations, and purely theoretical problems and return to practical philosophizing sensitive to local problems facing particular communities in particular historical contexts. While these thinkers do not form a homogenous movement, they share several substantive and methodological interests: to study rationality and knowledge from the vantage point of pragmatics or rhetoric of discourse; to see intellectual activities as embodied in specific systems of beliefs, institutional settings, oral traditions, and cultural practices; to view basic philosophical problems in a social-historical context; and to revive interest in philosophy as a form of experience and an art of living. Papers are invited from all fields of philosophy, especially these dealing with current philosophical problems from a pragmatist perspective and those that address the issue of rapprochement of American pragmatism (and neo-pragmatism) and various trends in contemporary European philosophy. Publication of a selection of papers from Pragmatic Humanism Forum is envisaged. Please send paper proposals and abstracts to Mateusz Oleksy at oleksy@filozof.uni.lodz.pl by May 30, 2008. Visit the conference website here: http://www.trans2008.pl/?page=humanism.

CFP: "Pragmatism and Naturalism Workshop," Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), May 7-9, 2008.

Many views are gathered under the banner of naturalism. What all of them share is a dismissal of aprioristic, high-brow philosophy, prior to all epistemic practices. This view raises major challenges that must ultimately be dealt with, such as whether naturalism allows for the formulation of norms by which our beliefs about the world can be assessed. One option that may be explored in this context is to ask whether a return to pragmatism offers a viable way out of the problems that confront naturalists more generally. Pragmatists have claimed that although all scientific statements are of a hypothetical character, intended to bring us to a state of thought at rest, they are our best guesses at the entities, processes, and structures of the universe. The aim of this workshop is to seek a better understanding of the core meaning and reach of both naturalism and pragmatism. Papers on naturalism, pragmatism and the relation between naturalism and pragmatism are invited. More information here: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/humanities/tilps/DescartesLectures/PragNat/.