Nulty, Timothy J. Review of Jack Reynolds, et al., eds. POSTANALYTIC AND METACONTINENTAL. NDPR (January 2010).

Reynolds, Jack, James Chase, James Williams, and Edwin Mares, eds.  Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides.  London: Continuum, 2010.

This important book is one of the better anthologies currently available on the relationship, or lack thereof, between the typically disparate traditions of analytic and continental philosophy. The anthology contains essays that offer broader general assessments of methodological differences between traditions as well as a number of very good essays on specific points of convergence or divergence between the traditions. The editors and authors are to be commended for their diligence in avoiding two common mistakes when characterizing these traditions -- either an essentialism which denies the possibility of meaningful dialogue between traditions or a deflationary view prone to ignoring important methodological and substantive differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Indeed, the editors, in their introduction, offer strong considerations for rejecting both of these characterizations while providing examples of their prevalence in the literature. This anthology is a valuable resource for those currently engaged in comparative work and for those who want to understand these two traditions beyond the usual superficial and frequently unjustified characterizations. In what follows, I will provide a brief summary of each of the major sections first and then return to examine in greater detail some of the chapters. . . .

Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=22229.

Lec: Stephen White, "Continental and/versus Analytical Political Thought," University College London, June 14, 2010.

Prof Stephen White (University of Virginia) will be giving a talk entitled 'Continental and/versus Analytical Political Thought' on Monday 14 June in London. The discussant will be Prof Jane Bennet (Johns Hopkins University). Venue: The Council Room, School of Public Policy, 29/30 Tavistock Sq, London WC1H 9QU. Time: 5-7 pm, 14 June 2010. This event is organised by UCL and the Centre for the Study of Political Thought at Queen Mary, University of London. For further information please contact Prof Jeremy Jennings at j.r.jennings@qmul.ac.uk.

Cfp: "The Cartesian 'Myth of the Ego' and the Analytic/Continental Divide," Radboud University of Nijmegen, September 3-4, 2010.

Themes and Objectives: The philosophical scene has been dominated for many years by the analytic/continental divide. This protracted history of antagonism has tended to obscure the fact that at least on one point the two traditions seem to be remarkably close, if not convergent. Despite all the differences in style and choice of topics, both traditions have been strongly shaped by a profound discussion with “Cartesianism”. Obviously, the term “Cartesianism” here does not necessarily refer to the historical positions defended by René Descartes. Quite to the contrary, both traditions seem to battle against a certain image of Cartesianism, broadly understood as the cluster of philosophical convictions grounded upon the supposition that philosophy should start from “the immediate data of consciousness” and not, for example, from human behaviour or man’s practical relation to reality as the existentialists and pragmatists would have it. One of the Cartesian doctrines that both analytic and continental philosophers generally found most unacceptable was that of the supposition of a pure Self, a pure Ego. What we could call the Cartesian “Myth of the pure Ego” stands for a number of theses: These roughly include two groups of convictions: 1) the metaphysical and epistemological claim that the conscious mind is an inner realm, connected to the outside world via the senses, to which only the ego has privileged access and about which it has incorrigible knowledge. 2) the methodological idea that this self forms the self-evident starting point of a philosophical system. Cartesian philosophy of mind has been a favourite target for analytic philosophers from the very beginning. Think only of Ryle’s critique of substance dualism as a category mistake. In recent days, Dennett’s use of the term “Cartesian Theater” is a prototypical example of the strawman-like position labelled ‘Cartesianism’. The term is used to denounce the view that consciousness is an inner space in which an ego, homunculus or other fictitious entity watches the data coming in from the ourside world. For its part, the continental tradition only became obsessed with combatting “Cartesianism” after Husserl revived the Cartesian ego in the shape of his transcendental phenomenology. In this sense, Husserl’s “Cartesianism” became profoundly influential exactly because it was so unacceptable to most of his followers. Continental philosophers have portrayed Descartes’s/Husserl’s “pure self” as a “phantastical invention” (Heidegger) or as a linguistic fiction (Derrida). This colloquium aims at a critical evaluation of the hidden anti-Cartesian consensus between analytic and continental philosophy. In this context, the colloquium will ask both historiographical and philosophical questions. Examples of historiographical questions include: to what extent did Descartes actually defend the “myth of the pure ego”? In other words, to what extent is “Cartesianism” a twentieth-century construction? What philosophical purposes does this construction serve? Is the rift between analytical and continental philosophy as deep as many have portrayed it? Philosophical questions include: which elements of the Cartesian tradition now still seem worth defending? Which ones should definitively be rejected, be it on the basis of insights gathered in analytic or on the basis of continental philosophy? Can philosophy really do without a “pure self”? Are there viable alternatives for a “pure self”? The organizers of this colloqium do not take an a apriori stand on these questions but invite participants to come to terms with “Cartesianism”, both from historical and contemporary philosophical perspectives. It is the hope of the organizers that in this fashion a fruitful dialogue not only between historical and systematic scholarship, but also between analytic and continental perspectives may result. Confirmed Speakers: Tom Sorell, Kathalin Farkas, Dan Zahavi, Shaun Gallagher Requirements: Papers are invited on any topic related to the theme of the conference. Please send us a brief summary of your paper (maximum 500 words) and a short CV. Submission deadline: 1 April, 2010. Decisions will be reported by 1 May, 2010. Inquiries and submissions should be directed to: leijenhorst@phil.ru.nl. Costs for travel and accomodation will be covered by the organizers. There is no conference fee.

Cfp: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. BALKAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming 2011).

Contemporary philosophy has been broadly conceived as divided into two camps, analytic and continental. These two camps often ignore each other, sometimes criticize each other, and most rarely discuss matters together in a friendly and constructive spirit. There are various reasons for this situation. Some of the reasons are historical, having to do with the unfortunate developments between the two World Wars that stopped the dialogue and communication between various philosophical schools in Germany and Central Europe. The gap went on widening, and now we have to deal with it. There are exceptions, however. On the topical side, there is already a fledgling tradition of dialogue in various areas. In philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology there is work being done in mediating between Husserlian phenomenological approach on the one hand and the approaches of cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind on the other. Shaun Gallagher is one of the exemplary authors doing such a crossing-boundary scholarly work. In philosophy of science there is a beginning of a dialogue between a more hermeneutically oriented approach and the traditional philosophy of science. An exemplary work is the 206 volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science devoted to “Hermeneutics and Science”. In political philosophy there are authors who combine the tradition of German idealism with inspiration from Rawls and Scanlon.

The philosophical situation in the Balkans has always been characterized by day to day contacts and collaboration between philosophers belonging to different schools and orientations. We see this as an opportunity for our journal: why not extend this spirit of tolerance and collaboration, and offer a space for dialogue between the two still antagonistic camps?

Those who are interested to contribute to the Special Issue of BJP for 2011 can find the guidelines for submission at http://www.philosophybulgaria.org/en/Publikacii/BJP/index.php.

The deadline for submission of papers is 31 December, 2010.

Champagne, Marc. "We, the Professional Sages: Analytic Philosophy's Arrogation of Argument."

Champagne, Marc. "We, the Professional Sages: Analytic Philosophy's Arrogation of Argument." Argument Cultures.  Ed. by Juho Ritola.  Windsor, ONT: OSSA, 2009.

ABSTRACT: One claim reiterated with increasing boldness by the 'analytic' tradition in philosophy is that what sets it apart from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to proper norms of argumentation. Gradated deviancy from this (supposedly univocal) canon by English-speaking practitioners has therefore raised important questions about who can repair under the banner “professional philosopher.” We will portray as deeply worrisome the idea that argumentation should secure not just conclusions, but disciplinary membership as well.
 
Download the paper here: http://yorku.academia.edu/documents/0059/5409/M._Champagne_-___Analytic_Philosophy_s_Arrogation__.pdf.

Hales, Steven D. "Review of Hans-Johann Glock's WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?" NDPR (October 2008).

Glock, Hans-Johann. What is Analytic Philosophy?. Cambridge: CUP, 2008. There has been a recent spate of books attempting to explain the origins and intrinsic nature of analytic philosophy. Among these, What is Analytic Philosophy? by Hans-Johann Glock is a standout. As a German trained in Britain who is a professor in Zurich, Glock is particularly suited to offer a cosmopolitan assessment of the philosophical scene and especially the purported difference between the analytic and continental flavors. What's more, his book is jam-packed with argument and nuance, perspicuously organized, historically sensitive, and wrapped in a clear, muscular prose. While some writers are content to offer an historical treatment of the origins of analytic philosophy, or attempt a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions analysis of "analytic philosophy," Glock commendably approaches the subject from several different angles. Chiefly interested in what analytic philosophy presently amounts to, Glock examines not only its genesis, but the geo-linguistic conception of the analytic/continental split, the relevance of the history of philosophy for analytics, whether analytic philosophy is distinguished by particular doctrines, topics of inquiry, or methodology, etc. He eventually works his way to offering a family resemblance account of "analytic philosophy." . . . Glock spends a considerable amount of ink showing that "continental philosophy" is a misnomer, that analytic philosophy had tight ties to continental Europe at its founding (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege), secondary development (Schlick, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach), and the present day. The geo-linguistic view of the analytic/continental divide is wrong in nearly every possible way. After a certain point, however, it feels like firing round after round from the Glock into a scarecrow, as if he spent fifty pages showing that "Kimberly" doesn't actually mean "beautiful meadow," no matter what the baby naming book said. Remember good old direct reference? "Continental Philosophy" is just a proper name -- figuring out quite what it is the name of (a philosophical school, method, set of problems, group of thinkers, etc.) is much more interesting than harping on why it is a bad moniker. Of course, Glock does more than criticize the name of continental philosophy. He gives a detailed and systematic account of the development of the fracturing within 20th century philosophy, and his knowledge of 19th and early 20th century German political history well informs his discussion of which philosophers might be in contact with whom. He offers a persuasive case that both the story of the British origins of analytic philosophy and the Anglo-Austrian origins tale told by Neurath and Haller are incomplete and lopsided. Glock maintains that analytic philosophy does not contrast so much with French or German philosophy, as with romanticism, irrationalism, and existentialism. Perhaps this is the nature of historical inquiry, but the entire issue of traditions and influences ultimately seems so varied and convoluted that philosophy resembles a braided rope with the strands frayed at the end. Glock attempts to trace back the frayed to the fray, but a linear journey is impossible. He does provide a worthwhile corrective to those who might be tempted to see analytic/continental as exhaustive. American pragmatism does not fit neatly into either of those categories, nor does traditional historical philosophy, which remains a prominent approach in continental Europe. As ways of doing philosophy, both of these might even be at the same metaphilosophical level as analytic and continental, and properly viewed as orthogonal traditions. . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=14386.

Sokolowski, Robert. "Review of Santiago Zabala's THE HERMENEUTIC NATURE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY." NDPR (August 2008).

Zabala, Santiago. The Hermeneutic Nature of Analytic Philosophy: a Study of Ernst Tugendhat. Trans. Michael Haskell and Santiago Zabala. New York: Columbia UP, 2008. This book is a translation of an Italian study that appeared in 2004. Its purpose is to introduce English readers to the work of Ernst Tugendhat, who has been an important figure in European philosophy for the past half-century. Tugendhat was born in 1930 in Brno, Czechoslovakia, into a Jewish family. His family moved to Switzerland in 1938 and then to Venezuela. He did his undergraduate studies in classics at Stanford. After the war, he returned to Germany and did doctoral work at Freiburg, where he was much influenced by Heidegger. His dissertation on Aristotle's theory of being and predication was published in 1958 under the title Ti kata tinos: Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegriffe. His Habilitationsschrift, also earned at Freiburg, was published in 1967 as Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Tugendhat was invited for a semester in 1965 to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, where he came into contact with analytical philosophy. He found the approach congenial and his next major work was Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language. It appeared in German in 1976 and in English in 1982. The book was the outcome of a course given at Heidelberg in 1970. In it Tugendhat asserts the importance of focusing on actual speech and sentences and thus gives his reading of Heidegger and phenomenology something of a "linguistic turn," but he also tries to give a hermeneutic reading of linguistic analysis. Another major work, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, appeared in German in 1979 and in English in 1986. Since that time, Tugendhat has concentrated on issues concerning human rights, ethics, and mysticism. He taught at Heidelberg from the conclusion of his graduate studies until the mid 1970s, when he left Germany for Chile. He has since lived in both Germany and South America, has held research positions in Starnberg and Berlin, and has commented on current social, political, and international topics. Some observers have contrasted Tugendhat with Gadamer, both of whom were indebted to Heidegger at the beginning of their intellectual careers: Gadamer developed Heidegger's thought in a "hermeneutic" direction, and Tugendhat is said to have developed it along "linguistic" or "semantic" lines. . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=14025.

Welch, Mark. "Review of Noel Carroll's THE PHILOSOPHY OF MOTION PICTURES." METAPSYCHOLOGY ONLINE REVIEWS April 29, 2008.

Caroll, Noel. The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. Any art form needs a philosophy; something that can begin to articulate its nature and value in representing and understanding our world. Hopefully, through the publication of this scholarly, detailed and thoroughly-argued book Carroll will finally put to rest the debate about whether or not films (aka motion pictures or moving images) can be seen as works of art. He makes the case persuasively that they can, and in the process exposes the limitations and narrowness of view of the opposing argument. Although the eponymous term moving pictures is not Carroll's preferred label (he would rather talk about the moving image and therefore it is a bit of a puzzle why he titled the book as he did) he does not waste undue time in making arcane arguments about whether we should be talking about films or cinema or whatever. We all pretty much know what we mean and we know what we sitting down to watch. Film-makers create and present a point of view that while it may be recorded is nevertheless created and imbued with choice. So, Carroll begins a careful and scholarly examination of the history of the philosophy of film, beginning with Munsterberg's 1916 exposition of what he called photoplays, through the traditional theorists such as Arnheim, Eisenstein, Bazin and Kracauer among others, to the period cultural studies to his own preferred and simplified position in which a pluralistic approach is applied and a functional definition is more important than any specificity of medium (that is to say, videotape, podcasting, CGI and new media can all be considered under the rubric of the moving image). . . . Read the rest here: http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=4207.

Larkin, William. "Review of Aaron Preston's ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE HISTORY OF AN ILLUSION." NDPR April 15, 2008.

Aaron Preston has written an extremely clear and richly provocative book on the nature of analytic philosophy (hereafter, AP). To provide a point of entry into his investigation, he initially characterizes AP as connected to a "particular philosophical outlook" that secured the attention and the loyalty of academic philosophers both in places that mattered . . . and in numbers large enough to generate the kind of regular and widespread discussion that would both require the coining of a new term and explain that term's subsequent entrenchment as one of the most familiar in the philosophical lexicon (2). The philosophical outlook in question, Preston will argue, has been traditionally conceived of as centered on the linguistic thesis that "philosophy is wholly or largely a matter of linguistic analysis." (31) The primary aim of Analytic Philosophy: the History of an Illusion is to explain the "rather peculiar career" of AP as traditionally conceived; in particular, its rapid rise and fall and its continuing regional dominance. (3) Preston's main conclusion is that this peculiar career can be explained by the fact that AP was never a philosophical school defined by the linguistic thesis but a social movement that arose when scientism gave rise to a pair of illusions concerning the linguistic thesis. . . . Read the rest here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12906.

deVries, Willem. "Review of Paul Redding's ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE RETURN OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT." NDPR April 18, 2008.

Redding, Paul. Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge: CUP, 2007. Analytic philosophy [AP] began, the stories tell us, in a reaction against "Hegelian thought," specifically, the neo-Hegelianism of late 19th century Britain. Russell and Moore overthrew the doctrines of internal relations, of the falsehood of the partial and the truth only of the whole, and of the fundamentally spiritual nature of the world. Most important, they brought into philosophy the new logic that had revolutionized a discipline that hadn't changed significantly since Aristotle invented it. Russell (particularly) promulgated a 'shadow Hegel,' a distorted, even mythical image that justified his philosophical patricide, and he sold it effectively for the rest of his life. After the Cambridge Two slew the Hegelian father and liberated philosophy from his oppressive regime, Hegel and Absolute Idealism became taboo, mentionable only with disgust, scorn, and ritualistic excoriation. Though AP is regularly accused of being not just ahistorical, but anti-historical, there is an identifiable canon of historical philosophers that (most) analysts think it is profitable and good (though perhaps not necessary) to read and ponder. Indeed, there has been some very good history of philosophy done by analytically trained scholars working on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, etc. But Hegel is not in the canon, and is still widely stigmatized in analytic circles. For the last 30 years (since Charles Taylor's 1975 Hegel), there has been talk of a rapprochement between AP and Hegelian thought. But Hegel's entry into the Anglo-American canon made only halting progress. In Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought Paul Redding spells out the latest case for thinking that (at last) the barriers that put Hegel beyond the analytic pale are breaking down. . . . Read the whole review here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12925.